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EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION IN THE LEGAL PROFESSION: A QUESTION OF ETHICS?
Alex B. Long*
Abstract
In recent years, the ABA and local bar leaders have taken numerous steps to raise awareness about the
need to increase diversity within the legal profession. In order to increase diversity, however, the legal
profession must also seek to eliminate unlawful employment discrimination. In most workplaces, an
employer’s main concern with respect to discrimination is the possibility of a civil suit. In a surprising
number of states, however, rules of professional conduct either explicitly prohibit employment
discrimination on the part of lawyers or could be easily read to do so. Amending the rules of professional
conduct in this manner is unlikely to have much of an impact when addressing employment discrimination
and increasing diversity in the legal profession. These kinds of rules may, however, serve additional
purposes that make their adoption worth considering.
I. INTRODUCTION
In recent years, members of the legal profession have increasingly spoken about the need to increase
diversity within the legal profession. The American Bar Association (“ABA”) has undertaken several
initiatives to increase diversity within the profession with respect to sex, race, disability, and sexual
orientation.1 Many state bars have undertaken similar measures, and numerous legal scholars have written at
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length on the subject.2 For their part, many large law firms have taken steps to increase racial and gender
diversity within their firms.3
Despite these efforts, the underrepresentation of individuals from various groups remains a significant
problem. Most people who are concerned about diversity within the legal profession are familiar with the
numbers. While women are hired at law firms at a similar rate to men, women tend to drop off the pyramid
to partnership at significantly higher levels.4 Lawyers of color continue to be underrepresented at both the
entry and partnership levels.5 And while most of the attention so far has focused on women and racial
minorities, other groups remain under represented in the legal profession. For example, the number of
lawyers with disabilities employed at law firms remains embarrassingly low.6 Perhaps equally disturbing is
the fact that increases in diversity in the legal profession have lagged behind gains in other professions.7
There is no question that lawyers from various groups are underrepresented in law firms, both at the
associate and partner level. The question is how best to address this problem. Employment discrimination
statutes establish a floor of permissible conduct with respect to hiring practices; employers are simply
prohibited from affirmatively engaging in discriminatory practices. 8 Diversity advocates, however, often
argue for measures above and beyond the floor of nondiscrimination established by law that law firms and
the legal profession more generally can take to increase the hiring and retention rates of lawyers from
nontraditional backgrounds.9 These suggestions include such measures as expanding the pool of law school
applicants,10 establishing better law firm outreach programs,11 establishing better mentoring programs,12 and
mandatory law firm reporting of diversity statistics with respect to hiring and promotion.13 In arguing for
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these kinds of measures, diversity advocates frequently point out the moral, normative case for diversity as
well as the more tangible benefits that flow to employers from increased diversity within law firms.14
But increasing diversity within the legal profession also requires eliminating or at least reducing
instances of actual employment discrimination.15 As a result, some diversity advocates have focused on
eliminating discrimination as a means of increasing diversity.16 One of the most common themes involves
amending the rules of professional conduct for lawyers to expressly prohibit employment discrimination.17
Indeed, one author finds it “baffling” that the ABA has not already done so.18
There can be no doubt that discriminatory conduct on the part of a lawyer—whether in the
employment context or in the course of representing a client—is particularly troublesome. The legal process
is based on equality. Lawyers’ discriminatory words or conduct undermines public confidence in and respect
for the judicial process as a whole by demonstrating that officers of the court do not take seriously the
notions of equal treatment on which the legal system is based.19 Consequently, many states have provisions
in their rules of professional conduct addressing bias in the course of representing a client or in the practice
of law.20 As this article headed to press, the ABA was considering adopting a similar rule. [Samson Habte,
ABA Ethics Committee Floats Anti-Bias Rule, July 29, 2015, http://www.bna.com/aba-ethics-committeen17179934053/]
Employment discrimination by lawyers may also result in a similar lack of trust among lawyers and
the public concerning the extent to which the legal profession truly believes its own words on the subject of
equality and equal justice.21 Perhaps for this reason, twelve states already have legal ethics rules that
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expressly prohibit employment discrimination by lawyers or that could easily be interpreted to do so. 22 It is
not self-evident, however, that regulating employment discrimination through the disciplinary process is
necessarily an effective or desirable means of addressing the problem. This Article examines the desirability
of taking such a measure by, for the first time, examining how existing employment discrimination law
impacts the ability of disciplinary authorities to apply anti-discrimination principles through rules of
professional conduct governing lawyers.
Part II focuses on the law of employment discrimination as it applies in the specific context of the
legal profession. This Part addresses some of the institutionalized obstacles to equal employment opportunity
within the legal profession with a particular focus on some of the newer legal challenges law firms may face
with respect to discrimination claims. To better assess the desirability of amending the rules of professional
conduct to prohibit employment discrimination, Part III examines the rules in those states that have already
adopted such an approach and the professional discipline decisions decided under those rules. Part IV
addresses some of the limitations of the existing rules when examined in light of current employment
discrimination law and considers whether the costs of amending the rules of professional conduct to prohibit
discrimination outweigh the benefits. Finally, drawing upon the United Kingdom’s experience with similar
rules, Part V proposes a new rule addressing bias and discrimination both in the employment context and in
the practice of law more generally.
II. EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION IN THE LEGAL PROFESSION
While employment discrimination remains a serious problem, the more blatant forms of
discrimination that were prevalent when Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 was enacted are less
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common; this is as true for law firms as it is for other types of employers.23 Instead, employment
discrimination is often a problem of implicit biases and institutionalized obstacles to equal employment
opportunity. As the following material explains, there is every reason to believe that these kinds of obstacles
remain prevalent among legal employers. In addition, newer legal theories present employers with
challenges for compliance with employment discrimination law. The following Part examines these issues.
A. Structural Barriers to Equal Employment Opportunity
The term “employment discrimination” frequently conjures up fairly grotesque forms of
discrimination: the employer with a formal policy against hiring employees of a particular race, the
supervisor who has no qualms about making sexist or racist statements in the workplace, or the employer
who engages in blatant quid pro quo sexual harassment. These kinds of cases still certainly exist. But they
are probably less common than they once were.24 Today, many employers have formal policies prohibiting
discrimination and ensure that their supervisors receive instruction regarding proper behavior in the
workplace.25
Instead, much of the discrimination that takes place in today’s workplace tends to involve more subtle
forms of cognitive or unconscious bias.26 As Professor Susan Sturm famously postulated, workplace biases
now often result from “patterns of interaction, informal norms, networking, . . . mentoring, and evaluation . .
. .”27 Thus, workplace inequality is often “structurally embedded in the norms and cultural practices of an
institution.”28
Commentators have noted ways in which law firm practices may adversely impact certain groups. The
practice of many law firms to hire only students who made strong grades at elite law schools may have a
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tendency to adversely impact minorities.29 Female and minority lawyers have cited the lack of reliable
mentors to whom they can relate as an obstacle to career development and advancement. 30 Less formalized
and more subjective promotion practices in which various cognitive and unconscious biases often materialize
may also work to the disadvantage of nontraditional associates seeking promotion to partner.31
The stereotyping that often results from cognitive bias and the exclusion that may result from an
organization’s culture and practices may manifest itself in a variety of ways in law firms. For example,
Professor Ann McGinley attributes some of the lack of diversity in law firms to “the masculine culture at law
firms,” which places a premium on hierarchical structure and competition.32 This culture may also manifest
itself in its preference for lawyers who are willing to work “‘on demand,’ free from domestic
responsibilities.”33 This preference may impact how “choice work assignments” are distributed, which, in
turn, may impact an associate’s chances for advancement.34 Women lawyers may also have difficulty
conforming their behavior to established masculine norms in law firms, and they may be viewed as lacking
leadership abilities or assertiveness.35 Women may also confront such stereotypical assumptions as the
notion that they are more likely to quit work after having children or are less driven to succeed more
generally.
The practices and norms within a law firm may also make that firm less willing to depart from the
standard operating procedures that disadvantage some lawyers within the firm. Law firms are, by nature,
resistant to change.36 This inflexibility may have adverse consequences for firm associates and partners who
seek departures from informal norms. For example, lawyers with disabilities may need workplace
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accommodations to help them perform the essential functions of their jobs.37 These accommodations could
range from the acquisition of assistive devices to more flexible working hours to modifications of
supervisory techniques.38 But in a legal climate increasingly fixated on competitiveness and hyperefficiency, these lawyers may bump up against the attitude that these kinds of accommodations amount to a
nuisance or are simply “not the way we do things around here.”39 So, for example, while the vast majority of
law firms report that they have policies permitting part-time work, few lawyers actually take advantage of
them for fear of the adverse consequences on their careers.40
B. New Issues for Employers
In addition to traditional types of statutory discrimination claims, employers within the last twentyfive years have had to contend with new statutory restrictions on their discretion as well as new and evolving
theories of liability.41 Legal employers are not immune to these changes. Indeed, these changes may have
greater potential implications for law firms than for other employers.
One relatively new area of potential liability for law firms involves discrimination claims from firm
partners. In 1984, the Supreme Court held in a lawsuit involving a sex discrimination claim by a law firm
associate against the firm of King & Spalding that Title VII was applicable to the selection of partners by a
partnership.42 A concurring opinion by Justice Powell, however, emphasized that the Court’s holding was
limited to a claim by a firm associate against the partnership and that Title VII would have no application to
a claim by a partner against the partnership.43 Nearly twenty years later, the Court made clear in Clackamas
Gastroenterology Associates, Inc. v. Wells that the designation of an individual as a “partner” is not a
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guarantee of immunity under Title VII.44 While recognizing that only “employees” are entitled to protection
under Title VII, the Court explained that one designated as a partner in a firm could still qualify as an
employee under common-law agency principles.45 Thus, to the extent that a shareholder lacks the power to
manage the business of the partnership, the shareholder should be treated as an employee for purposes of
Title VII.46 In an age of multi-tiered law firm partnership tracks, the Clackamas decision has obvious
implications for law firms.47 Numerous lawyers have since brought suit following the decision, alleging that
they were partners in name only and were thus proper plaintiffs under Clackamas.48
While Title VII has prohibited sex discrimination for fifty years, most federal courts have held that
Title VII does not prohibit discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation.49 In recent years, however, an
increasing number of states and localities have enacted statutes and ordinances prohibiting employment
discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation.50 In some jurisdictions where LGBT plaintiffs are not able
to take advantage of such measures, they may be able to bring a sex discrimination claim under Title VII on
the theory that the employer engaged in impermissible sex stereotyping.51
Second generation employment discrimination statutes may pose special problems for law firms. Title
VII and the Age Discrimination in Employment Act (“ADEA”)52 both employ an equality approach to
workplace discrimination; employers must treat their employees equally. The Americans with Disabilities
Act (“ADA”),53 however, requires employers to do more than simply refrain from making decisions on the
basis of an individual’s disability. Discrimination under the ADA also includes the failure to make
reasonable accommodations to the known impairments of employees with disabilities.54 To provide equality
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of opportunity for employees with disabilities, the ADA may require that an employer modify its normal
operating procedures or workplace policies.55 Thus, the ADA might require an employer to permit flexible or
part-time work schedules, telecommuting, or changes in how the employer supervises or gives instructions to
an employee with a disability.56
The “reasonable accommodation” requirement may pose a special challenge for law firms, where long
hours, “face time” with partners, and a “top-down” and “hands-off” approach to instruction and supervision
are often the norm.57 Yet, the ADA’s “reasonable accommodation” requirement proceeds from the premise
that employers are not permitted to insist upon a one-size-fits-all approach and may be required, within
reason, to modify existing polices and practices.58 The “reasonable accommodation” requirement has taken
on increased importance in recent years as a result of amendments to the ADA. The ADA Amendments Act
of 2008 (“ADAAA”)59 dramatically expanded the definition of “disability” under the statute.60 Thus, more
individuals will now qualify as having a disability and may be entitled to reasonable accommodations in the
workplace.61
The Family and Medical Leave Act (“FMLA”)62 also defines discrimination in a manner different
from first generation discrimination statutes. FMLA requires larger employers to provide unpaid leave from
work for serious medical conditions of employees and close family members.63 Thus, FMLA may require
law firms to grant associates time off from work in order to tend to family responsibilities involving health
care. While FMLA coverage is limited to employers with fifty or more employees and only applies where a
serious health condition is involved, a few states and many localities have included family responsibilities or
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related concepts in their employment discrimination laws.64 Thus, employers may be prohibited in some
states and localities from discriminating on the basis of family responsibilities, family status, or
parenthood.65 To the extent taking time off from work in order to tend to family responsibilities proves to be
at odds with the culture within a firm, female associates are more likely to suffer than male associates.66 As
the caselaw attests, however, men are not immune from family responsibilities discrimination.67 And, of
course, lawyers live in a world in which face time, required billable hours, and strict deadlines are a part of
life. Therefore, the potential for firm practices to come into conflict with FMLA or state or local law
covering family responsibilities is perhaps greater than in other workplaces.
II. ANTI-DISCRIMINATION AS A MATTER OF ETHICS
In an effort to increase diversity and reduce the instances of employment discrimination within the
legal profession, various authors and organizations have suggested amending the rules of professional
conduct to prohibit employment discrimination.68 A number of states have already amended their ethical
rules in a variety of ways to address the problems of bias and discrimination in the legal profession,
including employment discrimination. The following Part discusses some of the rule-based changes that
have been proposed or adopted and examines the experiences of states that have made such changes.
A. Existing Rules
1. Conduct Prejudicial to the Administration of Justice
The most direct statement within the ABA Model Rules of Professional Conduct condemning
discrimination actually appears in a comment. Model Rule 8.4(d) prohibits a lawyer from engaging in
conduct prejudicial to the administration of justice.69 Comment 3 to the rule explains that “[a] lawyer who, in
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the course of representing a client, knowingly manifests, by words or conduct, bias or prejudice based on
race, sex, religion, national origin, disability, age, sexual orientation, or socioeconomic status” may violate
the rule.70 Several states have gone a step further and incorporated the language of Comment 3 within the
black letter of Rule 8.4.71
Given the fact that the language focuses on a lawyer who manifests bias “in the course of representing
a client,” the rule does not seem to be designed to address employment discrimination.72 Indeed, courts
typically limit application of the rule to conduct that “undermines the legitimacy” of an identifiable case or
process.73 As a result, most of the cases involving violations of the rule based on the expression of bias
involve lawyers who have impermissibly interjected race or some other characteristic into a proceeding.74
Some states have rules of professional conduct that specifically prohibit a lawyer, in the course of
representing a client, from engaging in conduct that “is intended to appeal to or engender bias against a
person on account of that person’s race, gender, religion, national origin, disability, age, sexual orientation,
or socioeconomic status.”75 Thus, while the rule and comment stand as important expressions of the legal
profession’s intolerance for expressions of bias or prejudice, they are limited in their scope.
2. Discrimination in a Lawyer’s Professional Capacity
The rules of professional conduct in several states prohibit a lawyer from engaging in discrimination
or manifesting bias on the basis of race or other identity characteristics in the lawyer’s “professional
capacity” or in “the practice of law.”76 Nearly all of the disciplinary decisions under this type of rule involve
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a lawyer making discriminatory comments concerning judges,77 clients,78 or other parties.79 This type of rule
has also been extended to reach unwanted sexual advances toward a client.80
Because the rule focuses on a lawyer’s discriminatory conduct occurring in the lawyer’s “professional
capacity,” as opposed to in the course of representing a client, the rule is potentially broad enough to include
employment discrimination. For example, a comment to Maryland’s Rule 8.4 advises that sexual harassment
involving coworkers may violate the rule.81 New Jersey has a similar rule, which explicitly references the
fact that it covers employment discrimination.82
There are few instances in which lawyers have faced potential discipline under these kinds of rules for
engaging in employment discrimination. For example, nearly every reported disciplinary decision under
New Jersey’s rule involves discriminatory words or conduct directed at nonemployees, such as clients or
judges.83 A review of the reported disciplinary decisions in New Jersey produced only one case in which a
lawyer licensed in New Jersey faced possible discipline for employment discrimination, and that case
involved alleged employment discrimination against a lawyer’s secretary, not another lawyer. 84
3. Harassment
A few states have adopted rules of professional conduct that prohibit lawyers from engaging in
harassment in connection with a lawyer’s professional activities.85 For example, Minnesota prohibits a
lawyer from harassing a person “on the basis of sex, race, age, creed, religion, color, national origin,
disability, sexual orientation, or marital status in connection with a lawyer’s professional activities.”86 On
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their face, these kinds of rules appear broad enough to cover workplace harassment. Indeed, in some states,
the rules reference harassment in relation to “other [forms of] unlawful discrimination.”87
While this type of rule, on occasion, has been applied in the employment setting,88 the clear majority
of the reported disciplinary decisions under this type of rule have involved harassment outside of the
employment context. For example, one Minnesota lawyer was charged under the rule after making a series
of statements to a client in the course of seeking to collect outstanding legal fees that amounted to
harassment on the basis of religion or national origin.89 Another Minnesota lawyer was disciplined for
engaging in a pattern of bad faith litigation that included harassing statements toward judges and others.90
But easily the most common form of misconduct under this type of rule involves unwelcome sexual
advances and related forms of sexual misconduct toward clients and others in connection with the practice of
law.91 Thus, for example, a prosecutor was suspended for sending a series of sexualized text messages to a
domestic abuse victim.92
4. Discrimination in Violation of Law
Several states prohibit lawyers from engaging in discriminatory conduct in violation of the law.93 For
example, Minnesota prohibits a lawyer from committing a discriminatory act “prohibited by federal, state, or
local statute or ordinance that reflects adversely on the lawyer’s fitness as a lawyer.”94 Washington contains
a similar restriction, but does not require that the discrimination reflect adversely on the lawyer’s fitness as a
lawyer.95
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Some have raised concerns over the breadth of these kinds of rules, noting their potential impact on
the ability of lawyers to choose which clients they wish to represent.96 But there can be little doubt that these
rules would reach employment discrimination that is illegal under the law. Moreover, the fact that these rules
reference state or local law is significant in that state or local law may prohibit various forms of
discrimination (i.e., discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation) that is not prohibited by federal law.
There are almost no reported decisions involving violations of this type of rule.97 And, again,
disciplinary decisions under these rules that specifically involve employment discrimination are likewise
rare. In one of the few reported cases, an Ohio lawyer was accused by multiple employees of sexual
harassment.98 Applying the same standards applied in Title VII discrimination cases, the Ohio Supreme
Court found that the lawyer had engaged in professional misconduct under Ohio’s version of the rule by
creating a hostile work environment on the basis of sex in one instance.99
5. Employment Discrimination
Finally, a few states have rules of professional conduct that specifically prohibit lawyers from
engaging in discrimination in the employment context.100 Vermont’s Rule 8.4(g) is representative and
essentially reads like a combination of various federal employment discrimination statutes. Under the rule, a
lawyer may not “discriminate against any individual because of his or her race, color, religion, ancestry,
national origin, sex, sexual orientation, place of birth or age, or against a qualified handicapped individual, in
hiring, promoting or otherwise determining the conditions of employment of that individual.”101 With the
exception of the prohibition on discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation, which is not prohibited by
federal law, Vermont’s Rule 8.4(g) largely tracks the major federal employment discrimination statutes.
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There is some variation in terms of the rules’ coverage. For example, the District of Columbia stands
alone in prohibiting discrimination on the basis of family responsibility.102 New York prohibits
discrimination on the basis of marital status, but oddly omits religion.103 But all of the rules that address
employment discrimination prohibit discrimination on the basis of race, national origin, sex, sexual
orientation, age, disability, and (with the exception of New York) religion in the conditions of
employment.104
Interestingly, several of the rules express a preference for resolution of a discrimination claim through
the legal process before the disciplinary process should commence.105 For example, California’s Rule 2400(B)(2) provides that “[n]o disciplinary investigation or proceeding may be initiated by the State Bar
against a member under this rule unless and until a tribunal of competent jurisdiction, other than a
disciplinary tribunal, shall have first adjudicated a complaint of alleged discrimination and found that
unlawful conduct occurred.”106 A tribunal finding or verdict as to unlawful discrimination may be introduced
as evidence of violation of the rule, but discipline may not be imposed until the underlying judgment is
final.107
In addition to the existing rules, several scholars have offered their own proposed rules prohibiting
employment discrimination by lawyers. For example, Professor Eli Wald has proposed amending a comment
to Rule 8.4(d)’s prohibition on conduct prejudicial to the administration of justice that would explicitly
prohibit discrimination in employment practices.108 Wald’s proposed amendment contains at least two
noteworthy features.
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First, in addition to prohibiting discrimination on the basis of race and other characteristics commonly
listed in employment discrimination statutes, Wald’s amendment would also prohibit discrimination on the
basis of socioeconomic status,109 a characteristic not protected under federal discrimination statutes or
commonly protected under state statutes. Second, under Wald’s proposal, discrimination “could be
evidenced by hiring and promotion policies which result in patterns of under-representation of minorities
based on race, sex, religion, national origin, disability, age, sexual orientation or socioeconomic status.”110
This part of Wald’s proposal is inextricably tied to Wald’s ultimate goal of promoting diversity within the
legal profession.111 His reference to proving discrimination by establishing “patterns of underrepresentation,” however, sounds quite similar to a so-called “pattern and practice” action. Pattern and
practice cases are a specific form of employment discrimination actions in which plaintiffs seek to prove that
discrimination was the employer’s standard operating procedure.112 This is frequently done through the use
of statistics purporting to demonstrate systemic discrimination.113 The focus in such cases is on the existence
of a policy or practice of intentional discrimination affecting a class of employees as opposed to single,
isolated instances of discrimination. Wald’s proposal might also be read to mean that lawyers could be
subject to discipline under a disparate impact theory. Under this approach, disciplinary authorities could
discipline lawyers in firms that employed hiring or promotion policies that resulted in statistical
underrepresentation, even if producing such a result was not the employer’s intent.114
A review of the available disciplinary decisions in states with rules expressly prohibiting employment
discrimination quickly leads to the conclusion that professional discipline for engaging in employment
discrimination is rare.115 Discipline involving one lawyer engaging in employment discrimination against
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another is rarer still.116 For example, California’s Rule 2-400(B), which prohibits discrimination in “hiring,
promoting, discharging, or otherwise determining the conditions of employment of any person” has been in
place since 1994. A Westlaw search, however, reveals exactly zero disciplinary decisions involving the rule.
6. General Misconduct Rules
Finally, some lawyers have faced professional discipline even in the absence of professional conduct
rules that speak specifically to discriminatory conduct. For example, in a Colorado case, a lawyer who
engaged in a pattern of sexual harassment of employees was suspended for violating a rule of professional
conduct prohibiting conduct that reflects adversely on the lawyer’s fitness to practice law.117 One
justification for imposing discipline in these cases, even absent a rule that specifically addresses
discrimination, is that discriminatory conduct on the part of a lawyer “signals an indifference to ethical
obligations and disregard for the law which reflects adversely on respondent’s fitness to practice law.”118 In
theory, a lawyer who engages in employment discrimination in a state with a professional conduct rule that
generally prohibits conduct reflecting adversely on the lawyer’s fitness to practice law could be subject to
discipline.119 Most of the disciplinary decisions under these types of general conduct rules, however, have
involved lawyers who have engaged in sexual harassment of non-employees, most often clients.120
B. Proposed ABA Model Rule 8.4(g)
As this Article was being prepared for publication, the ABA’s Standing Committee on Ethics and
Professional Responsibility was in the process of developing a proposed amendment to the ABA’s Model
Rules. Under proposed Rule 8.4(g), it would be professional misconduct for a lawyer to
in conduct related to the practice of law, harass or knowingly discriminate against persons on the basis
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of race, sex, religion, national origin, ethnicity, disability, age, sexual orientation, gender identity,
marital status or socioeconomic status.
The proposed rule is noteworthy in several respects.
First, the proposed rule is not limited to discrimination occurring in the course of representing a client,
but covers discrimination “in conduct related to the practice of law.” A proposed comment clarifies that this
term includes the operation and management of a law firm.

While this comment makes plain that the

proposed rule covers employment discrimination, the proposed rule is not limited to employment
discrimination. Indeed, it is not even limited to discrimination in violation of the law. Instead, it simply
prohibits harassment or discrimination. The proposed rule is also quite broad in that prohibits discrimination
on the basis of a variety of traits, including some (sexual orientation, gender identity, marital status, and
socioeconomic status) that may not be illegal under federal or state law.

IV. LIMITATIONS ON ADDRESSING EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION THROUGH RULES OF PROFESSIONAL
CONDUCT AND SUGGESTIONS FOR CHANGE
All told, there are approximately twelve states that have rules specifically prohibiting employment
discrimination, that have been read to do so, or that probably do so. 121 There are few reported instances of
professional discipline under these rules that involve employment discrimination.122 The fact that these states
already have in place rules of professional conduct that specifically prohibit or otherwise cover employment
discrimination in the legal profession demonstrates that disciplinary rules can be amended to promote
diversity and eliminate discrimination. However, the fact that precious few lawyers have ever been
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successfully prosecuted under these rules raises questions as to how effective these rules really are and how
effective they could be in rooting out employment discrimination. The following Part examines these issues.
A. Structural Limitations on the Ability of Ethics Rules to Address Employment Discrimination
Perhaps one reason there are so few disciplinary decisions involving employment discrimination is
that there are relatively few complaints of discrimination filed with disciplinary authorities. Compared with
other categories of misconduct, complaints involving discrimination appear to be uncommon.123 There are a
number of structural limitations, however, involving the disciplinary process that undoubtedly contribute to
both the low number of complaints and the low number of disciplinary actions involving employment
discrimination.
1. Resources
Perhaps the most obvious limitation on the ability of the disciplinary process to effectively address
employment discrimination in the legal process is the lack of resources. Some rules of professional conduct
go unenforced or under-enforced due to budgetary constraints.124 Constrained by limited resources,
disciplinary authorities, as rational actors, can be expected to focus their attention on what they deem to be
the most significant rule violations.125 While employment discrimination in the practice of law is certainly an
important issue, it is not the type of issue most disciplinary prosecutors signed up to prosecute when they
became prosecutors. Employment discrimination is simply not the kind of ethical violation that most
prosecutors think about when they think about ethical violations.
Given the availability of a pre-existing body of law designed to address and remedy employment
discrimination, disciplinary authorities could be expected to preserve scarce resources and allow the judicial
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process to address the issue. The wisdom of such a course of action is borne out when one considers the
reality that employment discrimination litigation is often quite time-consuming and dependent on
discovery.126 It is a relatively straightforward matter to establish that a lawyer made discriminatory
statements to opposing counsel in a deposition or to a third party in the course of representing a client. It is
far more difficult and time-consuming to prove that race or some other impermissible factor was a
motivating factor behind a lawyer’s decision not to hire or promote another lawyer. Likewise, to the extent
disciplinary authorities are asked to root out systemic intentional discrimination within law firms or to
pursue disparate impact claims by relying on statistical analysis to establish that a specific employment
practice had a disparate impact on the hiring or promotion of particular groups, they would be asked to
undertake tasks requiring significant resources.127 It would be difficult for any state disciplinary agency to
effectively police both individual instances of employment discrimination and more systemic forms of
discrimination that may take place at larger law firms. Indeed, faced with its own resource problem, the
Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (“EEOC”), the federal agency charged with enforcing
discrimination law, has chosen to focus on systemic discrimination cases involving multiple plaintiffs rather
than individual-plaintiff cases so as to maximize the impact of its enforcement efforts.128
The problem of scarce resources is only compounded if disciplinary authorities are expected to
address new theories of liability and new forms of prohibited discrimination. For instance, prohibiting
lawyers from engaging in family responsibilities discrimination, as does the District of Columbia, would
force disciplinary authorities to delve into a fairly technical body of law, FMLA, complete with an elaborate
set of technical regulations.129 Adopting a rule that prohibits lawyers from engaging in discrimination on the
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basis of socioeconomic status—as Professor Wald’s proposal would130—would introduce a different
problem. There is very little law on the subject of employment discrimination on the basis of socioeconomic
status, thus likely forcing disciplinary authorities to establish an entirely new set of standards to guide their
enforcement efforts. Ultimately, disciplinary agencies, as currently constituted, may lack the resources
necessary to effectively address employment discrimination.
2. Discrimination Lawsuits as a Condition Precedent Professional Discipline
A related explanation for the limited number of disciplinary decisions involving employment
discrimination and a potential limitation on the overall effectiveness of ethical rules prohibiting
discrimination is the requirement in some jurisdictions that there must first be a judicial finding of
discrimination before professional discipline may be imposed. For example, California requires that before
professional disciplinary proceedings involving employment discrimination can be instituted, there must first
be a judicial finding in a legal proceeding that such discrimination has taken place.131 The reality is that few
employment discrimination plaintiffs actually survive summary judgment, proceed through trial, and
ultimately prevail before a jury.132 Discrimination cases are notoriously difficult to win for plaintiffs.133 This
is at least as true for plaintiffs suing law firms as it is for other kinds of plaintiffs.134 Indeed, for reasons
discussed later in this Article,135 employment discrimination lawsuits by lawyers suing their law firms are
relatively rare.136 Therefore, to the extent a jurisdiction seeks to preserve disciplinary resources by requiring
a finding of discrimination as a condition precedent to disciplinary action, there are likely to be few
disciplinary actions.
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In some jurisdictions, a judicial finding of employment discrimination is not a prerequisite to
professional discipline.137 Disciplinary authorities, however, may be prohibited from proceeding until there
has at least been a resolution of a judicial proceeding involving the same set of facts. In New York, for
example, a complaint regarding employment discrimination must first be brought before some tribunal other
than New York’s Disciplinary Committee.138 If there is a finding that the defendant engaged in unlawful
discrimination, that determination serves as prima facie evidence of professional misconduct.139 But the fact
that a legal employer prevailed in an underlying discrimination lawsuit would seem likely to deter
disciplinary authorities from pursuing disciplinary action.
3. The Clear and Convincing Standard
The fact that disciplinary authorities typically must establish misconduct through clear and convincing
evidence rather than by a mere preponderance of the evidence may also limit the number of prosecutions. In
one case, a jury concluded in a civil action that a New Jersey lawyer had engaged in unlawful disability
discrimination against his secretary when he failed to reinstate her following her disfigurement.140 When
prosecutors pursued a subsequent disciplinary action against the lawyer for the same misconduct, however,
the lawyer escaped professional discipline because the New Jersey Disciplinary Review Board concluded
that there was no clear and convincing evidence of discriminatory intent.141 Thus, despite the jury verdict in
the underlying discrimination case, the lawyer was found not to have violated the relevant New Jersey ethics
rule.142
4. The Absence of a Rule Prohibiting Employment Retaliation
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Another possible explanation for the lack of disciplinary action involving employment discrimination
is the fact that in states with rules prohibiting employment discrimination, there are no complementary rules
prohibiting employment retaliation. Title VII and the other major anti-discrimination statutes all contain
provisions prohibiting employers from retaliating against employees who oppose unlawful discrimination or
who participate in proceedings to remedy discrimination.143 The inclusion of these provisions reflects a
recognition of the fact that fear of employer retaliation is one of the primary reasons why employees do not
report discrimination.144 Thus, anti-retaliation provisions are a vital part of any discrimination statute.145
Importantly, statutory anti-retaliation provisions typically protect not only the victims of
discrimination but also those who voluntarily report discrimination or participate in internal or formal
proceedings.146 This is potentially significant, because if discrimination amounts to professional misconduct
that raises a substantial question as to a lawyer’s fitness to practice as a lawyer, another lawyer who knows
of the misconduct has a professional obligation to report it.147 By doing so, a lawyer may potentially open
himself up to retaliation on the part of an employer. Not only is there no rule of professional conduct
prohibiting retaliation when a lawyer fulfills this ethical duty, in some states there may also be no legal
remedy for the lawyer who is retaliated against.148 Thus, the threat of retaliation is a potentially strong
deterrent to another lawyer’s participation in the disciplinary process.
5. The Inability to Sanction Law Firms
Another structural limitation on the ability of ethical rules to address employment discrimination is the
absence of a rule permitting the imposition of discipline against a law firm. The rules of professional conduct
in nearly every jurisdiction only permit authorities to impose discipline on individual lawyers.149 A lawyer
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who orders or ratifies another lawyer’s misconduct may be subject to discipline, and a law firm partner or
supervisory lawyer may be subject to discipline where the lawyer knows of another lawyer’s misconduct and
fails to take prompt remedial action.150 But as a rule, law firms are not subject to discipline for their own
misconduct, nor are they vicariously subject to discipline for the misconduct of a firm lawyer.
This general rule of individual liability makes sense in the case of solo practitioners. But in the case of
law firm discrimination, it makes considerably less sense. There are certainly some discrimination cases—
most notably cases involving sexual harassment—in which there is a sole wrongdoer. But, as discussed
previously,151 discrimination on the part of an organization often involves multiple actors and bias embedded
within the structure of the organization. Partnership votes, for example, are likely to involve multiple
decisionmakers, basing their decisions on subjective criteria. This may result in decisions being made on the
basis of implicit biases that are difficult to pinpoint or confine to one decision maker. Policies and cultures
may develop within law firms that, if left unchecked, may adversely impact nontraditional lawyers. As an
ethical matter, individual partners may have a responsibility to make reasonable efforts to oversee the firm’s
internal practices and norms.152 But as a practical matter, where a firm’s practices and norms have a
discriminatory impact, the problem is most likely a structural one rather than the fault of any one partner.
B. Limitations on the Ability of Ethics Rules to Address Law Firm Discrimination
Even if some or all of the above limitations could be addressed by amending the rules of professional
conduct, there are inherent limitations on the ability of ethics rules to address employment discrimination in
the legal profession. First is the inherent complexity of modern discrimination law. To put it mildly,
employment discrimination law is a confusing, complicated area of law.153
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Examples abound. For two decades, courts and employment lawyers could not even agree on such
seemingly simple issues as what the appropriate proof structure was in a case lacking direct evidence of
discriminatory intent.154 In theory, the Supreme Court’s 2003 decision in Desert Palace, Inc. v. Costa shed
light on this particular issue, but considerable uncertainty regarding the question remains.155 As another
example, Title VII has different causation standards depending upon whether the plaintiff is pursuing a
discrimination theory or a retaliation theory.156 Title VII’s anti-discrimination provision employs a different
causation standard than does the ADEA’s anti-discrimination provision.157 And given the divergent
standards in these areas, no one is quite sure which causation standard applies to ADA discrimination and
retaliation claims.158 The standards governing sexual harassment are, by their nature, vague.159 The issue of
an employer’s vicarious liability for a supervisor’s discrimination is far from straightforward, and federal
courts are split as to when an employer is vicariously liable for retaliatory harassment of an employee by
coworkers.160 Congress’ failure to define the language in Title VII addressing disparate impact claims has
rendered disparate impact theory a highly confusing and often ignored area.161 While Congress recently
amended the definition of disability under the ADA to allow more individuals to qualify for disability status,
Congress failed to clarify when an accommodation is “reasonable” under the statute and when it imposes an
“undue burden.”162 Adding to the confusion is the reality that sometimes state discrimination law does not
neatly track federal law, thus creating the potential for an additional level of complexity.163
If a state chooses to adopt a rule of professional conduct prohibiting employment discrimination and,
in the process, incorporates the existing body of discrimination law, it will be incorporating a highly
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complex and uncertain set of legal standards. Alternatively, states could eschew established discrimination
law if they choose to amend the rules of professional conduct to prohibit discrimination. However, asking
disciplinary authorities to master not only the complexities of modern discrimination law, but to devise a
new and effective enforcement method is asking quite a bit. Regardless of the approach, if states expect their
professional responsibility organizations to engage in significant enforcement, they would need to be willing
to develop special units with special expertise and responsibility for addressing employment discrimination.
Another limitation arises simply by virtue of the fact that the respondents in any disciplinary action
would be lawyers. Anyone seeking to prove employment discrimination against a law firm—whether a
plaintiff in a civil suit or a disciplinary agency seeking to prosecute lawyers within the firm for
misconduct—faces significant problems of proof just based on the fact that the defendants are lawyers.164
Since the defendants are lawyers, they may be able to plausibly assert that the evidence necessary to
establish discrimination is subject to the attorney-client privilege.165 And while it is uncommon in modern
litigation for an employer to allow “smoking gun” direct evidence of discriminatory intent to exist, one has
to assume that such evidence is even harder to come by in the case of lawyers (who, one would assume, are
well trained enough to avoid producing incriminating documentation).166
But perhaps the most significant limitation on the ability of ethics rules to address employment
discrimination involves the structure of law firms. The same law firm norms and practices that may lead to
discrimination and exclusion may also make it exceptionally difficult to actually prove that same
discrimination. Title VII was enacted at a time when animus and outright exclusion were the primary barriers
to equal employment.167 While animus remains a problem, employment discrimination today typically
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involves more subtle, less detectable forms of discrimination. Therefore, as Professor Deborah Rhode has
observed, there is a “mismatch between legal definitions of discrimination and the social patterns that
produce it.”168 As Rhode notes, “most bias is not a function of demonstrably discriminatory treatment.”169
Instead, it is “a product of interactions shaped by unconscious assumptions and organizational practices” that
is difficult to trace to discriminatory motives.170 In short, significant questions remain as to whether existing
employment discrimination statutes are equipped to address the problems of modern workplaces.171
The result is that those seeking to prove employment discrimination within a law firm may face
“insurmountable proof problems.”172 Courts frequently require individuals seeking to establish disparate
treatment to present “comparator evidence,” i.e., evidence of how the employer treated an employee who
was “similarly situated in all relevant respects.”173 Yet, as Professor Nancy Levit has noted, “most law
practice is so individualized that comparator evidence simply does not exist.”174 Aside from in smaller law
firms, discrimination can rarely be traced to one, single bad actor.175 Instead, promotion decisions typically
involve multiple decisionmakers, thus making it more difficult to establish that one individual’s
discriminatory attitudes had any effect on the ultimate decision.176 Moreover, most partnership committees
do not base their decisions on a clearly-defined, fixed standard for promotion.177 Instead, they typically
employ more informal, subjective standards. This type of decisionmaking makes it more likely that cognitive
biases and unconscious stereotyping will influence the ultimate decision.178 But it also may make it more
difficult for individuals to prove that they were subjected to discrimination.179
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Disciplinary authorities are also likely to confront significant structural obstacles in attempting to rely
on statistical evidence to establish discrimination. There is certainly considerable statistical disparity in terms
of law firm hiring and promotion numbers.180 Reliance on bottom-line statistical disparity, however, is
insufficient to establish a prima facie case of disparate impact under Title VII.181 Instead, a plaintiff must
identify the specific employer practice that causes the statistical disparity.182 This presents anyone attempting
to establish a disparate impact case against a law firm with some significant problems.
First, most firms are not big enough to allow for meaningful statistical analysis.183 Second, even if the
firm is big enough to permit such analysis, it may be impossible for disciplinary authorities to identify the
specific practice that has caused the statistical disparity.184 As Professor Levit has explained, “lawyers work
in varying practice areas and on numerous different cases, with myriad project assignments, and in
constantly fluctuating teams.”185 This may make it virtually impossible to establish that one particular
practice caused the disparity. And while it is theoretically possible to identify an employer’s subjective
decisionmaking process as the specific practice producing the disparate impact, plaintiffs have generally had
little success with such claims.186 Finally, even if disciplinary authorities could overcome these obstacles, an
employer may still defend against a disparate impact claim by demonstrating the challenged practice was
job-related and consistent with business necessity.187 Given the longstanding practice in the legal field of
making promotion decisions on the basis of “high billable hour counts, rainmaking talent, ‘analytical
abilities,’ or other amorphous partnership-quality measures,” it should be a relatively easy matter for firms to
satisfy this defense.188 As a result of these types of structural obstacles, Professor Levit has observed that
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“[t]here are extraordinarily few disparate impact cases filed by lawyers against their firms.”189 Disciplinary
authorities proceeding under a systemic disparate treatment theory would face similar statistical problems, as
well as the host of problems presented in individual disparate treatment cases.190
C. Do the Costs Outweigh the Benefits?
As a result of these kinds of problems, there have been few successful employment discrimination
suits by lawyers against law firms. Similarly, there appear to have been almost no successful prosecutions
for professional misconduct involving employment discrimination by one lawyer against another. In the few
reported decisions in which a disciplinary authority actually charged lawyers with misconduct under these
rules, the alleged discriminatory conduct was typically directed at nonlawyers and involved fairly
straightforward and blatant instances of discrimination (e.g., unwanted physical contact amounting to sexual
harassment) instead of the more subtle forms of discrimination that often take place.191
All of this suggests that simply amending the rules of professional conduct to prohibit employment
discrimination among lawyers and enforcing the rule the same way other ethics rules are enforced is unlikely
to have much impact in terms of addressing employment discrimination and increasing diversity in the legal
profession. The fact that several of the states with such ethics rules have imposed a requirement—or at least
expressed a preference—for discrimination charges to first be dealt with through civil litigation perhaps
reflects the conclusion that relying upon disciplinary authorities to police discrimination in the same manner
they police, for example, mishandling of client funds is an inefficient allocation of scarce prosecutorial
resources.
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For instance, a comment to New Jersey’s rule expressly provides that employment discrimination is
not covered by the rule unless it has resulted in an agency or judicial determination of discriminatory
conduct.192 The rest of the comment explains the New Jersey Supreme Court’s thinking regarding this
requirement:
The Supreme Court believes that existing agencies and courts are better able to deal with such matters,
that the disciplinary resources required to investigate and prosecute discrimination in the employment area
would be disproportionate to the benefits to the system given remedies available elsewhere, and that limiting
ethics proceedings in this area to cases where there has been an adjudication represents a practical resolution
of conflicting needs.193
In light of all of the limitations to effective enforcement identified in this Article, one might perhaps
ask whether it is worth adopting any kind of ethical rule prohibiting employment discrimination. If
disciplinary prosecutors are going to be unable to prosecute but a few cases, perhaps it is not worth the added
expense of attempted enforcement. Perhaps employment discrimination in the practice of law is better dealt
with as a matter of law than as a matter of ethics.
This would be an overly narrow view of the purpose of rules of professional conduct. As Professor
Fred Zacharias once noted, “professional codes can properly include provisions that the drafters anticipate
will be enforced only rarely; legal ethics regulation typically implements a variety of functions, some of
which are well-served by hortatory rules.”194 While amending the rules to prohibit discrimination might not
lead to many prosecutions, it might still produce results that would justify the costs of doing so.
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The lawyer disciplinary process serves multiple functions, including the dissemination of the
profession’s values both within the profession and to the public.195 Rules of professional conduct might also
have what Zacharias refers to as a methodological objective: “influencing lawyer behavior by threatening
discipline or encouraging introspection.”196 Professional conduct rules that parallel or supplement existing
external law may educate lawyers concerning obligations about which they otherwise might not give any
thought.197 Such rules may cause lawyers to reflect upon the problem the ethics rules and substantive law
seek to address, thereby raising their consciousness concerning an issue.198 The ABA’s adoption of Model
Rule 1.8(j), which prohibits a lawyer from engaging in sexual relations with a client,199 provides an example.
Although such conduct might violate other rules of professional conduct as well as a lawyer’s fiduciary duty
to a client, the ABA adopted Model Rule 1.8(j), in part, to “alert[] lawyers more effectively to the dangers of
sexual relationships.”200 Finally, as Zacharias notes, professional conduct rules may also supplement
inadequate external law by informing lawyers as to their obligations and perhaps reducing their resistance to
complying with the external law on the subject.201
Amending the rules of professional conduct to more explicitly address bias, including employment
discrimination, in the practice of law is consistent with these objectives. A new rule of conduct addressing
these issues could be used to encourage legal employers to reevaluate and monitor their firm’s practices as
part of a comprehensive attempt to eliminate bias and employment discrimination, promote equal access to
justice, and increase diversity. While the threat of professional discipline might provide some limited
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encouragement, the more realistic objective would be for the rule to raise awareness concerning these issues,
thereby encouraging voluntary compliance.202
There are several reasons why the adoption of such a “soft” regulatory approach203 to the problems of
bias, discrimination, and underrepresentation is particularly appropriate in this instance. First, existing
employment discrimination law is decidedly inadequate when it comes to addressing implicit biases and the
structural causes of discrimination. Moreover, it is likely to remain that way for the foreseeable future. A
rule of professional conduct could supplement this existing body of law to help bring about reform. Much in
the same way the rule of professional conduct prohibiting sex with a client may help to educate lawyers
regarding their preexisting common law fiduciary duties with respect to clients,204 a rule addressing bias,
discrimination, and diversity may help to educate lawyers about the subtle ways in which employment
discrimination operates. Relatedly, much in the same way that the rules regarding pro bono legal services
and court appointments may serve to help educate lawyers about the problem of access to justice, such a rule
could help legal employers better understand the nature of the problem and the need for change. In this
sense, the rule could serve an important purpose despite the likelihood that it will be enforced infrequently.
In addition, adopting a specific rule that takes a comprehensive view of the problems could be a
means of communicating the legal profession’s commitment to the core values of equality of opportunity,
equal treatment, access to justice, and diversity.205 The legal system is, of course, based on principles of
equality. Discriminatory conduct on the part of lawyers is especially troubling because it displays a lack of
respect for these fundamental principles.206 In short, discriminatory conduct on the part of a lawyer raises a
serious question regarding that lawyer’s fitness as a lawyer. The legal profession’s toleration of such
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conduct—or at least its failure to expressly condemn it—sends a signal to the public and members of the
profession about the extent to which the profession has truly internalized these principles.
For example, while there is considerable disagreement whether incivility is prevalent enough within
the profession to justify the establishment of rules of professional conduct prohibiting incivility, there should
be no dispute that expressions of racial or similar forms of bias or prejudice directed at other lawyers or
participants in the legal process are intolerable. There are certainly enough cases involving this type of
misconduct to suggest that it is at least something of a problem within the profession.207 But while some
rules of professional conduct might indirectly speak to this type of misconduct, there is no express
disapproval of such conduct in the ABA Model Rules of Professional Conduct that signals to the public and
members of the profession that it is intolerable.
Discriminatory conduct, including employment discrimination, may also have potential consequences
in terms of the public’s access to justice. The legal profession’s commitment to ensuring access to justice
and a client’s right to counsel of her choice is embodied in numerous rules of professional conduct, including
the rules regarding pro bono services,208 accepting court appointments,209 a client’s absolute right to
discharge her lawyer,210 and agreements that limit a lawyer’s right to practice, including as part of a
settlement agreement.211 To the extent a client’s choice of lawyer or overall ability to receive legal services
is impacted by an employer’s discriminatory practices or conduct, the client’s right to counsel of her choice
and the public’s interest in access to justice are compromised. To the extent lawyers engage in harassment,
bias on the basis of race or other characteristics against clients or others, or the unwillingness to make the
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reasonable modifications necessary to allow clients with disabilities to receive legal services, they may
likewise limit access to justice and impede the proper functioning of the legal process.
In addition, employment discrimination among legal employers has obvious ramifications for the goal
of diversity within the profession. Discriminatory employment practices often leads to lawyers exiting the
practice of law.212 In turn, the lack of diversity within the profession may have implications for the public’s
perception of the legal profession. As the ABA’s Presidential Diversity Initiative has explained, “Without a
diverse bench and bar, the rule of law is weakened as the people see and come to distrust their exclusion
from the mechanisms of justice.”213 Partly for this reason, diversity has increasingly come to be seen by the
legal profession as a fundamental value of the profession.214 A rule specifically addressing employment
discrimination and diversity would be a step toward articulating the legal profession’s commitment to this
value.
At present, the ABA Model Rules of Professional Conduct do little to express the legal profession’s
commitment to equality and diversity. The clearest indication of this commitment is buried in a comment to
Rule 8.4(d)’s prohibition on conduct prejudicial to the administration of justice.215 If the legal profession
wishes to send a clearer message on the subject, the ABA and states should amend their rules of professional
conduct to expressly prohibit employment discrimination.
V. A PROPOSED RULE
If a new rule designed to cover employment discrimination is in order, what should it look like? The
rules that currently exist in some jurisdictions might provide some possible models. After considering
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possible models, this Part of the Article proposes a new Model Rule of Professional Conduct that speaks to
diversity and discrimination.
A. The Need for a More Specific Rule
As discussed, a number of states have rules of professional conduct that simply prohibit a lawyer from
engaging in bias in a lawyer’s professional capacity. 216 Proposed ABA Model Rule 8.4(g) takes a similar
approach. Such a rule has at least two disadvantages. First, it fails to speak directly to the subject of
employment discrimination. Second, it is so broadly worded that it potentially covers a wide range of
conduct, thus increasing the odds that such rule would arouse the opposition of members of the bar. For
example, when the Tennessee Board of Professional Responsibility proposed a similar rule in 2013 that
would have prohibited bias in a lawyer’s professional capacity, the Tennessee Bar Association opposed the
amendment and raised concerns that the proposed rule would cover statements made in the state legislature,
statements made in CLEs, statements in advertisements for legal services, and statements made in
professional articles, books, or opinion columns. Members of the bar also filed numerous comments
opposing the proposed rule on the grounds that it would potentially subject them to professional discipline
for their decisions concerning whether to represent particular clients. [Public Comments to Proposed
Amendment, available at http://www.tncourts.gov/sites/default/files/comments__proposed_amendment_to_supreme_court_rule_8_section_8_4_5.pdf.]
As discussed, there are also a number of states that have rules prohibiting harassment218 that might
potentially serve as a model for a new rule. These rules speak more directly to the problem of employment
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discrimination. They are limited only to harassment, however, and do not address the range of other
discriminatory practices lawyers have engaged in, including other forms of employment discrimination.
The rules that exist in some states that specifically prohibit employment discrimination219 or
discrimination in violation of law220 hold more promise. Even these rules, however, are somewhat limited.
First, while they prohibit employment discrimination, they provide little other guidance to lawyers. They do
not address the structural nature of much of employment discrimination, nor do they provide law firm
partners with much guidance as to what steps they can take to develop a structure that promotes equality of
opportunity.
Second, the rules are underinclusive to the extent that they fail address the full range of discriminatory
conduct that stands in conflict with the fundamental values of the legal profession. Employment
discrimination is certainly an issue in the legal profession. But other forms of discrimination outside of the
employment context may also undermine the legal profession’s commitment to equality and access to
justice. For example, there are numerous cases involving lawyers who engaged in improper sexual conduct
toward clients.221 This has included such behavior as threatening to withdraw from representation unless a
client submitted to the lawyer’s sexual advances,222 sending a series of sexualized communications to a
client,223 and manipulating a client into posing nude under the pretense that it was necessary to advance the
client’s personal injury claim.224 This is conduct that is currently regulated in most states, if at all, by tort law
and disciplinary rules that were not designed to address such misconduct and that provide for an uneasy
fit.225 Similarly, most rules of professional conduct do not specifically address incivility on the basis of race
or other factors. For example, one lawyer’s discriminatory and abusive comments toward another lawyer in
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the course of a deposition would not be covered under a rule prohibiting employment discrimination or
discrimination in violation of law. Instead, it would be dealt with, if at all, by other somewhat ill-fitting rules
of conduct or local civility codes.226 These are situations, however, in which the conduct in question
undermines core values of the legal profession. At present, the legal profession deals with them in only an
indirect manner.
B. The United Kingdom Approach
If a state chooses to amend its rule to include an express prohibition on discrimination, it should do so
in a manner that speaks clearly to the range of discriminatory conduct that undermines the fundamental
values of the legal profession. The United Kingdom might provide a possible model. In an effort to address
the underrepresentation of women and minorities in the legal profession in England and Wales, the Legal
Services Board, the independent body responsible for overseeing the legal profession in those countries,227
released a report containing recommendations for increasing diversity within the profession.228 The report
identified numerous causes of underrepresentation, including inflexible work policies, informal work
practices and policies that work to the disadvantage of women and racial minorities, and stereotyping.229 The
report made various recommendations to increase diversity within the profession, including the suggestion
(eventually adopted) that law firms collect data on diversity within their firms.230
The legal profession has adopted other rules-based measures to increase diversity and to address bias
and prejudice within the profession to approach the issue of diversity. The U.K. Legal Services Act of 2007
sets forth eight “regulatory objectives,” one of which is “encouraging an independent, strong, diverse and
effective legal profession.”231 The Solicitors Regulatory Authority (“SRA”), the “front-line regulator” for
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solicitors in England and Wales, and the Bar Standards Board (“BSB”), the front-line regulator for barristers
in England and Wales,232 have both adopted rules of professional conduct addressing diversity and
discrimination. In addition to articulating clear standards regarding diversity and discrimination, the rules
take a structural approach to dealing with the problems.
For example, Chapter 2 of the SRA’s Code of Conduct does several noteworthy things. First, it makes
a clear statement as to the importance of “encouraging equality of opportunity and respect for diversity, and
preventing unlawful discrimination . . . .”233 Second, it takes a holistic approach to these values that is not
limited to employment discrimination. Instead, the duty applies to a lawyer’s relationship with his client and
others, including other lawyers.234 Thus, the duty extends to the employee recruitment process, the provision
of legal services to clients, and the treatment of third parties in connection with client matters.235 Third, the
Code establishes a series of mandatory outcomes with which lawyers must comply. These include:
(1) Avoiding unlawful discrimination and avoiding victimization or harassment of others;
(2) providing services to clients in a way that respects diversity;
(3) making “reasonable adjustments to ensure that disabled clients, employees or managers are not placed at
a substantial disadvantage compared to those who are not disabled,” and that the costs of these adjustments
are not passed on to these disabled clients, employees or managers;
(4) ensuring that the firm’s approach to recruitment and employment encourages equality of opportunity and
respect for diversity; and
(5) dealing with complaints of discrimination “promptly, fairly, openly, and effectively.” 236
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Importantly, Chapter 2 emphasizes the need for these values to be “embedded” within a law firm and
for firm partners to adopt policies to promote these values.237 Chapter 2 lists several actions that might
indicate that a law firm is in compliance with its obligations under this chapter. These include having a
written equality and diversity policy that, among other things, details how the firm “will ensure equality in
relation to the treatment of employees, managers, clients and third parties instructed in connection with client
matters” and how it will deal with complaints of discrimination.238 Also indicative of a firm’s compliance
with its obligations would be the fact that the firm provides employees and managers with training on the
subjects of equality and diversity and that the firm reviews and updates its internal policies regarding these
issues.239 Thus, Chapter 2 recognizes that bias and discrimination may be structural problems that can only
be dealt with adequately by internalizing these values and developing effective polices and supervisory
methods to prevent bias and discrimination from occurring.
The BSB has adopted its own set of Equality and Diversity Rules as part of the Code of Conduct
contained in its Handbook.240 Like the solicitors’ rules, the BSB’s Equality and Diversity Rules take a
structural approach to the issues of diversity and discrimination. Barristers’ chambers are required to have in
force “a written statement of policy on equality and diversity” and “a written plan implementing that
policy.”241 They must also have an Equality and Diversity Officer, training in fair recruitment and selection
processes, recruitment and selection processes that use “objective and fair criteria,” fair distribution of work
opportunities, an anti-harassment policy that sets out a procedure for dealing with complaints of harassment,
as well as other measures, including “a policy aimed at supporting disabled clients, its workforce and others
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including temporary visitors.”242 The Rules also require that an office engage in monitoring and regular
review of its policy in order to ensure that it complies with the Rules.243
C. A Proposed Rule
To address the concerns raised in this Article, the ABA and state supreme courts should adopt a rule
along the lines of the following:
Rule 9.1: Diversity and Equality
(a) Lawyers should aspire to further the principles of elimination of bias, equality of opportunity, equal
access to the courts and its institutions, and diversity.
(b) It is professional misconduct for a lawyer, in the lawyer’s professional capacity:
(1) To engage in employment discrimination prohibited by federal or state law;
(2) To engage in harassment or to knowingly manifest, by words or conduct, bias or prejudice toward clients,
lawyers, judges, or others on the basis of race, sex, religion, national origin, disability, age, sexual
orientation, or socioeconomic status;
(3) To fail to make reasonable modifications in policies, practices, or procedures as necessary to enable
clients with disabilities to receive legal services unless doing so would fundamentally alter the nature of the
services provided, or to fail to take such steps as may be necessary to ensure that clients with disabilities are
not denied services because of the absence of auxiliary aids and services, unless the entity can demonstrate
that taking such steps would fundamentally alter the nature of the legal services being offered or would result
in an undue burden.
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(c) It is professional misconduct for a lawyer to retaliate against any individual because the individual has, in
good faith, opposed any practice made professional misconduct by this Rule, or because the individual has
made a charge, testified, assisted, or participated in any manner in an investigation, proceeding, or hearing
concerning any practice made professional misconduct under this Rule.
(d) A partner in a law firm, and a lawyer who individually or together with other lawyers possesses
comparable managerial authority in a law firm, shall make reasonable efforts to ensure that the firm has in
effect measures giving reasonable assurance that no individual is subjected to conduct in violation of this
rule.
Several features of the proposed rule bear explanation.
1. Furthering the Principles of Equality of Opportunity, Equal Access to the Courts and Its Institutions, and
Diversity
Proposed Rule 9.1(a) articulates the legal profession’s commitment to equality of opportunity, equal access
to the courts and its institutions, and diversity. Much like the Model Rule regarding the provision of pro
bono services, the proposed rule establishes an aspirational goal on the part of lawyers.244 Imposing a
mandatory duty to further the principles of equality of opportunity, equal access to the courts and its
institutions, and diversity would invite a host of unresolvable interpretation issues that would render the rule
unenforceable. Thus, like a lawyer’s obligations regarding pro bono services, Rule 9.1(a) is aspirational in
nature.
Comments to the rule could clarify the meaning and extent of the rule. For example, borrowing from
the ABA’s Presidential Diversity Initiatives, a comment could explain the connection between diversity and
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respect for the rule of law.245 The same comment could also explain why other principles, such as promoting
equal access to the courts and its institutions, are core values of the legal profession.
A comment could also identify ways in which lawyers may comply with the rule. This could include
attending continuing legal education (“CLE”) courses on such topics as how to identify ostensibly neutral
employment practices that have a disparate impact on women and minorities; education concerning implicit
bias as it relates to hiring practices and the practice of law more generally; how to address negative attitudes
or comments on the part of other lawyers or judges; what a lawyer’s legal and ethical obligations are with
respect to clients with disabilities and what the legal obligations of public entities are with respect to making
courtrooms and court proceedings accessible to people with disabilities; and measures law firms can take to
increase diversity in the workplace.246
2. Engaging in Employment Discrimination
To convey a clear message about the profession’s core values, any rule of professional conduct
addressing diversity and equality should speak specifically to employment discrimination. Moreover, by
linking the rule to established federal and state law, rulemakers can eliminate at least some potential
interpretive issues and simplify the disciplinary process. The prohibition on employment discrimination,
however, should specify that the rule is limited to violations of federal and applicable state law rather than
listing a series of protected characteristics as some existing rules of professional conduct do. In theory,
positive law reflects shared values. A rule of professional conduct that references existing federal or state
law would reflect those values.247 Prohibiting discrimination on the basis of traits that are not covered under
existing law invites controversy and confusion in implementation.
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To further address the problems of complexity and inadequate resources, a comment should clarify
that disciplinary authorities should ordinarily defer or abate disciplinary proceedings while a civil case or
administrative proceeding is still pending that involves the same facts. Abatement of disciplinary
proceedings is already a common practice in many jurisdictions and is a means of allowing other
proceedings to help develop a factual record, thereby conserving the resources of disciplinary authorities.248
For example, a comment to the District of Columbia’s rule of professional conduct regarding employment
discrimination notes the expertise of agencies such as the EEOC on the subject of employment
discrimination, and another comment notes that disciplinary authorities may defer or abate disciplinary
proceedings until the resolution of another agency or civil proceeding.249 This approach represents an
improvement over the requirement in some states that there must first be a judicial finding that
discrimination has occurred before disciplinary proceedings can commence.250 This approach prevents
disciplinary authorities from acting where an otherwise potentially meritorious civil case is dismissed on
procedural grounds or where a plaintiff settles prior to trial. Because so few cases actually proceed to trial
and result in a finding of liability, some instances of discrimination may go unaddressed under this approach.
Thus, a finding of liability should not be a condition precedent to professional discipline. At the same time, it
represents a means of conserving disciplinary resources while allowing for full development of the factual
record and legal arguments.
3. Engaging in Harassment and Manifesting Bias and Prejudice
Proposed Rule 9.1(b)(2) is part of the attempt to take a comprehensive approach to the problem of bias
in the legal profession. Specifically, it represents an attempt to address the problem of bias and
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discrimination outside the confines of the employment relationship. As such, it is designed to cover
misconduct that is covered only indirectly by existing rules, such as one lawyer’s discriminatory statements
or conduct to another lawyer or a third party in the course of representing a client as well as a lawyer’s
harassing sexual behavior toward a client.251
Importantly, this part of the rule (along with Rule 9.1(b)(1)) is limited to conduct occurring in the
lawyer’s professional capacity. Because some misconduct may occur outside the course of representing a
client—such as the case where a lawyer sexually harasses a prospective client or a lawyer harasses a former
client on the basis of a race252—a broader rule is needed. A comment, however, should be included to limit
the reach of the phrase “in the lawyer’s professional capacity” to those and similar situations. Thus, the
lawyer who engages in bias or prejudice while serving as an elected representative in the state or legislature
or who makes racist statements on a legal blog or in a book or article should not be subject to discipline
under the rule. Consistent with longstanding norms of the legal profession, the comment could also clarify
that a lawyer’s decisions with respect to whether to represent a client are not within the scope of the rule.
4. Failing to Make Reasonable Modifications
Rule 9.1(b)(3) addresses the special nature of disability discrimination, including the fact that the
failure to provide legal services to a disabled client in a readily accessible manner effectively deprives that
client of full access to justice. In this sense, the rule parallels the ADA’s provisions with respect to the
provision of services by places of public accommodation.253 The proposed rule is also part of the attempt to
address equality issues in a comprehensive manner. Comments to the rule should clarify that the rule covers
the provision of auxiliary aids or interpreters as necessary to effectively communicate with a client.
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Moreover, the comments should clarify that, consistent with the ADA, the costs of making any necessary
modifications or acquiring any necessary aids or interpreters may not be passed along to a client.254
5. Retaliation
Proposed Rule 9.1(c) is designed to address the potential for retaliation. The proposed rule largely
tracks the language of Title VII’s anti-retaliation provision.255 In order to reduce unnecessary complexity, a
comment could clarify that, to the extent feasible, the rule should be interpreted in a manner consistent with
federal law. Thus, for example, it would be professional misconduct for a lawyer to take any action in
retaliation against an individual for engaging in protected activity under the proposed rule that might
dissuade a reasonable person from opposing professional misconduct under the rule or making or supporting
a charge of professional misconduct under the rule.256
6. Special Responsibilities of Law Firm Management
Finally, proposed Rule 9.1(d) attempts to address the structural causes of the problems of bias,
inequality, and underrepresentation. Much like current Model Rule 5.1, the proposed rule would impose
upon law firm partners and those with similar managerial authority an affirmative obligation to develop and
monitor law firm policies and procedures.257 But the proposed rule would be broader in that it would speak
directly to policies and procedures designed to address employment discrimination and the other forms of
misconduct identified in the rule. Drawing upon the U.K. experience,258 a comment to the rule could identify
several indicators of compliance with rule. These might include the fact that the lawyer’s firm has a written
equality and diversity policy, that the firm provides employees and managers with training on the subjects of
equality and diversity, that the firm provides training in fair recruitment and selection practices, that the firm
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has an anti-harassment and discrimination policy with detailed procedures for dealing with complaints, that
the firm has a policy aimed at supporting disabled clients, employees, and others (including visitors to the
firm), and that the firm reviews and updates its internal policies regarding these issues.259 While the
existence of such measures within a firm would be indicators of compliance with a lawyer’s obligation under
the rule, the rule still imposes an individual duty upon law firm partners.260 Thus, a firm partner who actively
engages in discrimination or who otherwise fails to make reasonable efforts as required under the proposed
rule would still be subject to discipline despite the existence of firm-wide policies and procedures addressing
bias and diversity.
VI. CONCLUSION
The lack of diversity within the legal profession remains a serious problem. But existing employment
discrimination statutes are poorly equipped to address the structural causes of workplace discrimination that
often occur. It is therefore unrealistic to expect rules of professional conduct based on these laws to root out
discrimination and increase diversity in the legal profession in the traditional sense.
But that is not a reason to reject the adoption of ethics rules that speak to the problem of employment
discrimination and, more generally, the problems of bias, access to justice, and underrepresentation in the
legal system. By adopting such rules, the legal profession could take a soft regulatory approach to these
problems in an attempt to educate and motivate lawyers and law firms with regard to the problems. This type
of gentle regulatory nudge might potentially yield more dividends than reliance on legal rules alone.
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modified Oct. 27, 2005). See also U.S. EQUAL EMP’T OPPORTUNITY COMM’N, EEOC NO. 915.002,

ENFORCEMENT GUIDANCE ON THE AMERICANS WITH DISABILITIES ACT AND PSYCHIATRIC

DISABILITIES para. 26 (1997), available at 1997 WL 34622315, at *13.

57. See Eli Wald, In-House Myths, 2012 WIS. L. REV. 407, 445 (2012) (noting high billable

targets and significant face time expectations at large law firms).

58. See supra note 55 and accompanying text.

59. ADA Amendments Act of 2008, Pub. L. No. 110-325, § 4(a), 122 Stat. 3553, 3555

(codified at 42 U.S.C. § 12101 (2012)).
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60. Alex B. Long, Introducing the New and Improved Americans with Disabilities Act:

Assessing the ADA Amendments Act of 2008, 103 NW. U. L. REV. COLLOQUY 217, 219 (2008).

61. Cheryl L. Anderson & Leonard Gross, Discrimination Claims Against Law Firms:

Managing Attorney-Employees from Hiring to Firing, 43 TEX. TECH L. REV. 515, 523 (2011).

62. 29 U.S.C. §§ 2615(a)–(b).

63. 29 U.S.C. § 2612(a)(1).

64. Michael Z. Green, Unpaid Furloughs and Four-Day Work Weeks: Employer Sympathy or

a Call for Collective Employee Action?, 42 CONN. L. REV. 1139, 1161 (2010).

65. See, e.g., ALASKA STAT. § 18.80.220(a)(1) (2014) (parenthood); Human Rights Act, D.C.

CODE § 2-1401.01 (family responsibilities and familial status); S.F., CAL., ADMIN. CODE ch. 12Z

(2015) (parental responsibility).
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66. See Catherine Albiston et al., Ten Lessons for Practitioners About Family Responsibilities

Discrimination and Stereotyping Evidence, 59 HASTINGS L.J. 1285, 1285–86 (2008) (discussing

family responsibilities discrimination as a form of sex discrimination).

67. See Keith Cunningham-Parmeter, Men at Work, Fathers at Home: Uncovering the

Masculine Face of Caregiver Discrimination, 24 COLUM. J. GENDER & L. 253, 257 (2013)

(discussing sex-discrimination cases involving men).

68. See supra note 17 and accompanying text.

69. MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 8.4(d) (1983).

70. Id. cmt. 3.
71. See, e.g., FLA. RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 8.4(d) (2015); see also R.I. RULES OF PROF’L
CONDUCT R. 8.4(d) (2015). The text of Rhode Island’s rule is not limited to conduct occurring in

the course of representing a client, but the comment to the rule speaks only to such conduct. R.I.
RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 8.4(d) cmt. 3.
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72. One exception would be Missouri, whose Rule 8.4(g) prohibits a lawyer from manifesting

bias or prejudice in the course of representing a client, but also includes a comment explaining

that the rule may be violated through sexual harassment occurring in the employment context.
MISSOURI RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 8.4(g) cmt 4 (2015).

73. Fla. Bar v. McLawhorn, 505 So. 2d 1338, 1341 (Fla. 1987) (quoting Polk v. State Bar of

Texas, 374 F.Supp. 784, 788 (N.D. Tex. 1974); In re Spikes, 881 A.2d 1118, 1126 (D.C. 2005).
Texas specifically limits its rule in this manner. See TEX. DISC. RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R.

5.08 (2015) (prohibiting a lawyer from manifesting bias in connection with an adjudicatory

proceeding).

74. See, e.g., In re Thomsen, 837 N.E.2d 1011, 1012 (Ind. 2005) (disciplining a lawyer who

made repeated references before the jury about the fact that the ex-wife (a white woman) of his
client was living with “a black man” or “a black guy”); In re Charges of Unprofessional Conduct

Contained in Panel Case No. 15976, 653 N.W.2d 452 (Minn. 2002) (disciplining lawyer who
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sought to have judge’s disabled law clerk removed from the courtroom); Fla. Bar v. Martocci,
791 So.2d 1074 (Fla. 2001) (disciplining lawyer who engaged in “sexist, racial, and ethnic
insults” during depositions). See also MASS. RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 3.4(i) (2015)

(prohibiting a lawyer from engaging in conduct manifesting bias or prejudice while appearing in

a professional capacity before a tribunal). The comment to the rule itself expresses a concern

about the discriminatory use of peremptory strikes. MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 8.4

cmt. 3.
75. COLO. RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 8.4(g) (2015) (emphasis added); see also IDAHO
RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 4.4(a)(1) (2015) (prohibiting conduct intended to appeal to or

engender bias against a participant in court proceeding).
76. See, e.g., IND. RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 8.4(g) (2015); IOWA RULES OF PROF’L
CONDUCT R. 32:8.4 (2015); N.J. RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 8.4(g) (2015).
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77. In re Geller, No. DRB 02-467, 1, 39 (N.J. 2003),

http://njlaw.rutgers.edu/collections/drb/decisions/02-467.pdf.

78. See In re Pinto, No. DRB 00-049, 1, 16 (N.J. 2000),

http://njlaw.rutgers.edu/collections/drb/decisions/00-049.pdf (disciplining a lawyer for making

crude sexually explicit comments to client).

79. In re Dempsey, 986 N.E.2d 816 (Ind. 2013) (disciplining a lawyer under Rule 8.4(g) after

he made various anti-Semitic statements about opposing parties); In re Kelley, 925 N.E.2d 1279
(Ind. 2010) (reprimanding lawyer who asked company representative if he was “gay” or
“sweet”); In re McCarthy, 938 N.E.2d 1279 (Ind. 2010) (suspending a lawyer for thirty days for

making racist statement to third party).

80. See In re Pinto, No. DRB 00-049 at 14 (disciplining a lawyer for making crude sexually

explicit comments to client).
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81. MD. LAWYERS’ RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 8.4 cmt. 3 (2015). Iowa’s rule likewise
prohibits sexual harassment and also prohibits “other unlawful discrimination,” thus perhaps

suggesting that it covers employment discrimination. IOWA RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT

R. 32:8.4(g) (2015).
82. N.J. RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 8.4(g) (2015) (noting that employment discrimination
is only covered “where there has been a prior “final agency or judicial determination” of

discrimination on the part of the lawyer)

83. In re Geller, No. DRB 02-467, 1, 43 (N.J. 2003),

http://njlaw.rutgers.edu/collections/drb/decisions/02-467.pdf (reprimanding a lawyer for, inter

alia, making discriminatory remarks about a judge); In re Pinto, No. DRB 00-049 at 14

(disciplining a lawyer for making crude sexually explicit comments to client). See also In re

Walterschied, Nos. DRB 00-234 and DRB 00-235 (2001),
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http://njlaw.rutgers.edu/collections/drb/decisions/00-235.pdf (disciplining a lawyer for, inter

alia, engaging in sexual harassment of a client).

84. In re Gourvitz, Docket No. DRB 05-117, 1, 1 (N.J. 2005),

http://njlaw.rutgers.edu/collections/drb/decisions/05-117.pdf.
85. IOWA RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 8.4(g); MINN. RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 8.4(g)
(2015); WIS. RULES PROF’L CONDUCT R. 8.4(i) (2015).
86. ILL. RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 8.4(j) (2015); MINN. RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R.

8.4(g).
87. IOWA RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 8.4(g); see also WIS. RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R.
8.4(i) committee cmt. (“What constitutes harassment under paragraph (i) may be determined
with reference to anti-discrimination legislation and interpretive case law.”).

88. In re Ward, 726 N.W.2d 497, 497 (Minn. 2007) (involving unwanted sexual contact with a

non-lawyer applicant for employer).
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89. In re Woroby, 779 N.W.2d 825, 825 (Minn. 2010).

90. In re Nett, 839 N.W.2d 716, 718 (Minn. 2013).

91. Iowa Sup. Ct. Bd. of Prof'l Ethics & Conduct v. Steffes, 588 N.W.2d 121, 124 (1999)
(suspending a lawyer under older version of ethical rules prohibiting “sexual harassment or other
unlawful discrimination)”; In re Walterschied, Nos. DRB 00-234 and DRB 00-235 at 19 (2001),

http://njlaw.rutgers.edu/collections/drb/decisions/00-235.pdf (disciplining a lawyer for, inter

alia, engaging in sexual harassment of a client); In re Dudley, 2013-OLR-5, 1, 2 (Wis. 2013),

http://www.wicourts.gov/services/public/lawyerreg/statuspublic/dudley.pdf (publicly

reprimanding a lawyer for sending sexualized e-mails to client); In re Kratz, 851 N.W.2d 219,

223 (Wis. 2014) (suspending county district attorney for sending inappropriate text messages to a
crime victim and making inappropriate statements to others). Iowa’s version of the rule prohibits
sexual harassment “in the practice of law,” which the Iowa Supreme Court has held applies to

harassment directed against non-clients, provided it occurs while the attorney is engaged in the
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practice of law. Iowa Supreme Court Disc. Bd. v. Moothart, 860 N.W.2d 598, 603 (Iowa 2015).
Thus, “[t]he rule may be violated if a lawyer sexually harasses witnesses, court personnel, law

partners, law-office employees, or other third parties that come into contact with a lawyer
engaged in the practice of law.” Id.

92. In re Kratz, 851 N.W.2d at 221.
93. See ILL. RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 8.4(j) (2015); IOWA R. OF PROF’L CONDUCT R.

8.4(g) (2015) (prohibiting sexual harassment and other forms of unlawful discrimination); MINN.
RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 8.4(h) (2015); OHIO RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 8.4(g) (2015);
WASH. RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 8.4(g) (2015).
94. MINN. RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 8.4(h).
95. WASH. RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 8.4(g). The rule is also limited to acts that violate

Washington state law.
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96. The most famous example of this is the case of Stropnicky v. Nathanson, 19 M.D.L.R. 39

(MCAD Feb. 25, 1997), in which the Massachusetts Commission Against Discrimination ruled

that a law firm that chose to represent only women in divorce cases violated Massachusetts civil

rights law by engaging in sex discrimination. See Joan Mahoney, Using Gender as a Basis of

Client Selection: A Feminist Perspective, 20 W. NEW ENG. L. REV. 79, 91 (1998) (criticizing the

decision).

97. According to a representative of the Minnesota Office of Lawyers Professional

Responsibility, there had been only one instance of professional discipline—a stipulation for
private probation—for violation of Minnesota’s version of this rule between 1992 and 2014. E-

mail, July 31, Patrick Burns, Minnesota Office of Lawyers Professional Responsibility (on file

with author).

98. Cincinnati Bar Assn. v. Young, 731 N.E.2d 631, 638 (Ohio 2000). One of the employees

was a law student working as a legal assistant. Id. at 634. Another appears to have been
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contemplating applying for admission to the Ohio Bar. Id. at 636. The others were hired as legal

assistants. Id. at 636–37.

99. Id. at 637–38.
100. CAL. RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 2-400(B)(2) (2015); D.C. RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT
R. 9.1 (2015); N.Y. RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 8.4(g) (2015); VT. RULES OF PROF’L

CONDUCT R. 8.4(g) (2015).
101. VT. RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 8.4(g).
102. D.C. RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 9.1.
103. N.Y. RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 8.4(g).
104. See D.C. RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 9.1; VT. RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 8.4(g).
105. This is also true of Illinois’ statute, which simply prohibits discrimination that violates a
federal, state, or local statute. ILL. RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 8.4(j) (2015).
106. CAL. RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 2-400(C) (2015).
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107. Id.

108. Wald, supra note 1, at 1115.

109. Id. at 1115.

110. Id.
111. See id. at 1115 (explaining that “by limiting the scope of their anti-discrimination rules to

prohibit only conduct by existing antidiscrimination law, 188 states have implicitly exempted

under-representation”).

112. Int'l Brotherhood of Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S. 324, 336 (1977).

113. Id. at 340 n.20.

114. Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 429–30 (1971).
115. See Wald, supra note 1, at 1115 (stating that “even in jurisdictions that explicitly deem

discrimination regarding terms of employment professional misconduct, such as California, the
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District of Columbia, and New York, there have been no disciplinary actions enforcing these
rules”).

116. The only decision I could find in a jurisdiction that expressly prohibits discrimination

involved discrimination by an attorney against a project assistant. Letter from Joyce E. Peters,

Bar Counsel, to James H. Cohen, Esquire (Mar. 28, 2002) (on file with the District of Columbia

Bar).

117. People v. Lowery, 894 P.2d 758, 760 (Colo.1995) (per curiam).

118. In re Discipline of Peters, 428 N.W.2d 375, 382 (Minn. 1988).

119. Unless the discriminatory conduct amounted to a crime, a lawyer who engages in

employment discrimination would not be subject to discipline for violating Model Rule 8.4(d),
which prohibits a lawyer from committing a criminal act that reflects adversely on the lawyer’s
honesty, trustworthiness or fitness to practice law. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 8.4(b)

(1983).
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120. See In re Yarborough, 524 S.E.2d 100, 104–05 (S.C. 1999).
121. CAL. RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 2-400(B)(1) (2015); D.C. RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT
R. 9.1 (2015); ILL. RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 8.4(j) (2015); IND. RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT
R. 8.4(g) (2015); IOWA R. OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 32:8.4(g) (2015); MINN. RULES OF PROF’L
CONDUCT R. 8.4(h) (2015); N.J. RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 8.4(g) (2015); N.Y. RULES OF
PROF’L CONDUCT R. 8.4(g) (2015); OHIO RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 8.4(g) (2015); VT.
RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 8.4(g) (2015); WASH. RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 8.4(g)
(2015); WIS. RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT FOR ATTORNEYS R. 8.4(i) (2015).

122. I conducted a Westlaw search of disciplinary decisions in each of the twelve jurisdictions.

In addition, where a jurisdiction maintains a searchable database of disciplinary decisions, I

searched those. Professional discipline may include private reprimand (i.e., a reprimand that is

not made public). But their private reprimands are difficult to research.
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123. For example, the 2013 Annual Report of the Illinois Attorney Registration and

Disciplinary Commission reports just two complaints of discrimination, compared to 2,408

complaints of neglect. Annual Report of 2013, ATTORNEY REGISTRATION & DISCIPLINARY

COMMISSION 15 (Apr. 29, 2014), https://www.iardc.org/AnnualReport2013.pdf. Neither of the

two complaints resulted in formal disciplinary charges. Id. at 23. According to one representative

of a disciplinary commission with whom I communicated, the commission does keep track of the

number of complaints received involving general categories of misconduct, but has not

established a category for complaints involving discriminatory conduct, primarily because there
have been so few complaints. E-mail from Charles Harrington, Iowa Att’y Disciplinary Board

(July 28, 2014) (on file with author).
124. Fred C. Zacharias, What Lawyers Do When Nobody’s Watching: Legal Advertising as a

Case Study of the Impact of Underenforced Professional Rules, 87 IOWA L. REV. 971, 974

(2002).
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125. See id. at 1003 (attributing some of the underenforcement of the rules regarding attorney
advertising to the possibility that “disciplinary agencies with limited resources may consider
other rule violations more important”).

126. JOHN F. BUCKLEY IV & MICHAEL R. LINDSAY, DEFENSE OF EQUAL EMPLOYMENT CLAIMS
§ 13:5 at 13-7 (2d ed. 2011) (“All litigation is expensive and employment discrimination
litigation is particularly so.”).

127. See Anne Noel Occhialino & Daniel Vail, Why the EEOC (Still) Matters, 22 HOFSTRA
LAB. & EMP. L.J. 671, 703 (2005) (referring to systemic discrimination cases as “complicated,
expensive, and time consuming”); Laya Sleiman, A Duty to Make Reasonable Efforts and a

Defense of the Disparate Impact Doctrine, 72 FORDHAM L. REV. 2677, 2712 (2004) (referring to
disparate impact cases as “expensive, time consuming, and difficult to win”).

128. See William R. Corbett, Unmasking a Pretext for Res Ipsa Loquitur: A Proposal to Let

Employment Discrimination Speak for Itself, 62 AM. U. L. REV. 447, 468 (2013) (discussing the
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EEOC’s decision to focus on systemic discrimination); Martha Neil, EEOC Takes Bigger Aim:

Commission Announces a 'Systemic' Focus on Discrimination Cases, 5 No. 16 ABA J. E-REPORT
4 (Apr. 21, 2006), available at 5 No. 16 ABAJEREP 4 (WestlawNext) (describing the EEOC’s
decision to put more emphasis on “high-impact cases, including those that involve multiple
plaintiffs”); Maurice Wexler et al., The Law of Employment Discrimination From 1985 to 2010,
25 ABA J. LAB. & EMP. L. 349, 382–83 (2010) (discussing EEOC’s Systemic Program, with its

focus on multiple-plaintiff cases).

129. See Shay Ellen Zeemer, FMLA Notice Requirements and the Chevron Test: Maintaining a
Hard-Fought Balance, 55 VAND. L. REV. 261, 262 (2002) (noting the complexity of FMLA’s

provisions).

130. See supra notes 108–11 and accompanying text.

131. See supra notes 106–07 and accompanying text.
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132. See generally Kevin M. Clermont & Stewart J. Schwab, Employment Discrimination

Plaintiffs in Federal Court: From Bad to Worse?, 3 HARV. L. & POL'Y REV. 103, 103 (2009)
(asserting employment discrimination plaintiffs “have a tough row to hoe” in federal court).

133. See id.
134. See Rhode, supra note 5, at 1065 (“Close to fifty years’ experience with civil rights

legislation reveals almost no final judgments of sex or race discrimination involving law
firms.”).

135. See infra notes 164–66.

136. Levit, supra note 23, at 70.

137. See Cincinnati Bar Ass’n v. Young, 731 N.E.2d 631, 638 (Ohio 2000) (holding that there

need not be a preliminary finding of discrimination in a civil matter before discipline may be

imposed).
138. N.Y. RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 8.4(g) (2015).

Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2588594

SSRN DRAFT VERSION (DO NOT DELETE)

No. 2]

1/12/2016 8:45 AM

EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION IN THE LEGAL PROFESSION

131

139. Id.

140. See In re Gourvitz, No. DRB 05-117 (N.J. 2005),

http://njlaw.rutgers.edu/collections/drb/decisions/05-117.pdf.

141. Id. at 35.

142. Id. at 50.

143. See, e.g., 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-3(a) (2012) (prohibiting retaliation under Title VII).

144. Crawford v. Metro. Gov’t of Nashville & Davidson Cnty., 555 U.S. 271, 279 (2009).

145. See Burlington N. & Santa Fe Ry. Co. v. White, 548 U.S. 53, 63 (2006) (discussing the
importance of Title VII’s anti-retaliation provision within its remedial scheme).

146. Crawford, 555 U.S. at 279–80.

147. MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 8.3(a) (1983).

148. See Jacobson v. Knepper & Moga, P.C., 706 N.E.2d 491 (Ill. 1998) (refusing to recognize

retaliatory discharge claim of lawyer who insisted that law firm cease unethical filing practices).
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149. Julie Rose O'Sullivan, Professional Discipline for Law Firms? A Response to Professor

Schneyer's Proposal, 16 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 1, 2–3, 7 (2002)

150. MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 5.1(c).

151. See Sturm, Lawyers and the Practice of Workplace Equity, supra note 28, at 281.

152. MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 5.1.

153. See, e.g., Corbett, supra note 128, at 450 (referring to employment discrimination law as
“confused and discredited”); Sandra F. Sperino, Rethinking Discrimination Law, 110 MICH. L.
REV. 69, 71 (2011) (noting the “doctrinal, procedural, and theoretical confusion within
employment discrimination law” and the field’s “endless questions about frameworks” rather

than core issues).

154. See Desert Palace, Inc. v. Costa, 539 U.S. 90 (2003).
155. See Corbett, supra note 128, at 490 (noting the “uncertainty and confusion” following

Desert Palace).
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156. See Univ. of Texas Sw. Med. Ctr. v. Nassar, 133 S.Ct. 2517 (2013) (explaining why Title
VII’s anti-discrimination causation standard does not apply in retaliation cases).
157. See Gross v. FBL Fin. Servs., 557 U.S. 167 (2009) (explaining why Title VII’s causation

standard does not apply in ADEA cases).

158. See Brooks v. Capistrano Unified Sch. Dist., 1 F.Supp.3d 1029, 1037 (C.D. Cal. 2014)
(applying “but-for” causation standard to ADA retaliation claim); Quillen v. Touchstone Med.

Imaging LLC, 15 F.Supp.3d 774, 780 n.10 (M.D. Tenn. 2014) (noting split among federal courts

on the issue); Siring v. Or. State Bd. of Higher Educ. ex rel. Eastern Oregon University, 977
F.Supp.2d 1058, 1062 (D. Ore. 2013) (applying a “motivating factor” to ADA discrimination
claims); see also Lisa Schlesinger, Note, The Social Model’s Case for Inclusion: “Motivating
Factor” and “But For” Standards of Proof Under the Americans with Disabilities Act and the

Impact of the Social Model of Disability on Employees with Disabilities, 35 CARDOZO L. REV.

2115, 2117–18 (2014) (noting the existence of a circuit split on this issue).
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159. See Larsa K. Ramsini, Note, The Unwelcome Requirement in Sexual Harassment:

Choosing a Perspective and Incorporating the Effect of Supervisor-Subordinate Relations, 55

WM. & MARY L. REV. 1961, 1962 (2014) (referring to the vague and uncertain standards that

exist in the lower courts).

160. See Alex B. Long & Sandra F. Sperino, Diminishing Retaliation Liability, 88 N.Y.U. L.

REV. ONLINE 7, 7 (2013) (discussing the split on this issue).

161. See Joseph A. Seiner, Plausibility and Disparate Impact, 64 HASTINGS L.J. 287, 297
(2013) (discussing the difficulty of interpreting Title VII’s disparate impact provisions); Charles

L. Sullivan, Disparate Impact: Looking Past the Desert Palace Mirage, 47 WM. & MARY L.

REV. 911, 958–64 (2005) (discussing the muddled development of disparate impact theory that
has left the theory “a complicated and confusing doctrine”).

162. James Concannon, Mind Matters: Mental Disability and the History and Future of the

Americans with Disabilities Act, 36 LAW & PSYCHOL. REV. 89, 114 (2012).
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163. Alex B. Long, “If the Train Should Jump the Track . . . ”: Divergent Interpretations of

State and Federal Employment Discrimination Statutes, 40 GA. L. REV. 469, 473 (2006).
164. See Levit, supra note 23, at 69 (noting the “particular difficulties” plaintiffs face when

suing law firms).

165. Id. at 72.

166. Id. at 75; Rhode, supra note 5, at 1066.

167. See Sturm, Second-Generation Employment Discrimination: A Structural Approach,

supra note 24, at 459–60 (discussing the outright exclusion that initially characterized

employment discrimination).

168. Rhode, supra note 5, at 1065.

169. Id.

170. Id.
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171. See Samuel R. Bagenstos, The Structural Turn and the Limits of Antidiscrimination Law,
94 CALIF. L. REV. 1, 3 (2006) (“Unconscious bias . . . generates inequalities that our current
antidiscrimination law is not well equipped to solve.”).

172. Levit, supra note 23, at 72.

173. Id. at 74.

174. Id. at 73.

175. Rhode, supra note 5, at 1065.

176. See Staub v. Proctor Hosp., 562 U.S. 411 (2011) (involving alleged discrimination by

some actors, but not necessarily on the part of the ultimate decisionmaker); Charles R. Lawrence

III, The Id, the Ego, and Equal Protection: Reckoning with Unconscious Racism, 39 STAN. L.
REV. 317, 319 (1987) (“[W]here several decisionmakers are involved, proof of racially
discriminatory motivation is even more difficult.”).

177. Rhode, supra note 5, at 1065.
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178. Sturm, Second-Generation Employment Discrimination: A Structural Approach, supra

note 24, at 485.

179. Rhode, supra note 5, at 1065.

180. See supra notes 4–6 and accompanying text.

181. Levit, supra note 23, at 81.

182. Wards Cove Packing Co., Inc. v. Atonio, 490 U.S. 642, 656–58 (1989).

183. Levit, supra note 23, at 81–82.

184. Id. at 81.

185. Id.
186. See Watson v. Ft. Worth Bank & Tr., 487 U.S. 977 (1988) (holding that an employer’s

subjective practice may amount to a specific employment practice that is actionable under Title

VII); Elizabeth Tippett, Robbing a Barren Vault: The Implications of Dukes v. Wal-Mart for

Cases Challenging Subjective Employment Practices, 29 HOFSTRA LAB. & EMP. L.J. 433, 455–
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56 (2012) (reporting results of study finding low number of such claims and lower than average

success rate).

187. Civil Rights Act of 1991, Pub. L. No. 102-166, 105 Stat. 1071, 1071.

188. Levit, supra note 23, at 83.

189. Id. at 81.
190. See id. at 84 (“Systemic disparate treatment cases will encounter many of the same
statistical problems as disparate impact suits.”).

191. See Cincinnati Bar Ass’n v. Young, 731 N.E.2d 631, 640 (Ohio 2000); People v. Lowery,

894 P.2d 758, 760 (Colo. 1995) (en banc).
192. N.J. RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 8.4 (2015).

193. Id.
194. Zacharias, What Lawyers Do When Nobody’s Watching: Legal Advertising as a Case

Study of the Impact of Underenforced Professional Rules, supra note 124, at 974.
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195. See generally Balla v. Gambro, Inc., 584 N.E.2d 104, 110 (Ill. 1991) (stating that rules of
professional conduct “hope to articulate in a concrete fashion certain values and goals”); Gary A.

Munneke, Dances with Nonlawyers: A New Perspective on Law Firm Diversification, 61
FORDHAM L. REV. 559, 601 (1992) (stating that the rules are an “an expression of the legal
profession's duties in light of professional values”); Fred C. Zacharias, The Purpose of Lawyer

Discipline, 45 WM. & MARY L. REV. 675, 698 (2003) (identifying one of the purposes of the

disciplinary process as enhancing the image of the legal profession).

196. Fred C. Zacharias, Specificity in Professional Responsibility Codes: Theory, Practice, and

the Paradigm of Prosecutorial Ethics, 69 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 223, 227 (1993).

197. Id. at 255 n.99.

198. Id.

199. MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.8(j) (1983).
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200. REPORTER’S EXPLANATION OF CHANGES Rule 1.8(j), available at

http://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/migrated/cpr/e2k/10_85rem.authcheckdam.pdf

(last visited Oct. 8, 2015).

201. Zacharias, Specificity in Professional Responsibility Codes: Theory, Practice, and the

Paradigm of Prosecutorial Ethics, supra note 196, at 255.

202. Interestingly, there is also a history of using the law in a similar manner in the

employment discrimination field. Professor Susan Carle has argued that the earliest employment
discrimination laws at the state level used “regulatory techniques to induce employers to

voluntarily scrutinize and revise traditional employment practices to open more employment
opportunities for racial minorities.” Susan D. Carle, A Social Movement History of Title VII

Disparate Impact Analysis, 63 FLA. L. REV. 251, 255 (2011). The original supporters of these
laws “viewed law as a means of motivating employers to engage in voluntary self-scrutiny and
revision of their employment practices to increase minority employment opportunities.” Id.
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203. Id. at 251.

204. See Zacharias, Specificity in Professional Responsibility Codes: Theory, Practice, and the

Paradigm of Prosecutorial Ethics, supra note 196, at 255 n.99.
205. See generally Wald, supra note 1, at 1092 (“Arguably, by remaining silent about fostering

diversity and combating discrimination in its most significant role—attorney regulation—the

organized bar sends an implicit message of ambivalence regarding diversity legitimizing inaction
by other legal constituencies.”).

206. See supra note 19 and accompanying text.

207. See supra notes 78–80 and accompanying text.

208. See MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 6.1 (1983).

209. See id. R. 6.2.

210. See id. R. 1.16(c); id. cmt. 4.

211. See id. R. 5.6(b); id. cmt. 1.
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212. See Levit, supra note 23, at 68.

213. AM. BAR ASS'N, PRESIDENTIAL DIVERSITY INITIATIVE, DIVERSITY IN THE LEGAL

PROFESSION: THE NEXT STEPS 9 (2010).

214. Christopher J. Whelan & Neta Ziv, Law Firm Ethics in the Shadow of Corporate Social

Responsibility, 26 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 153, 182 (2013).

215. See supra note 70 and accompanying text. It bears mentioning that the impact of this

comment is undermined somewhat by the fact that the comment goes on to explain that the fact

that a judge has found a lawyer to have used his peremptory strikes in a discriminatory manner is

not a basis for discipline. MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 8.4 cmt. 3.

216. See supra notes 74–84 and accompanying text.

218. See supra notes 85–92 and accompanying text.

219. See supra notes 100–06 and accompanying text.

220. See supra notes 93–99 and accompanying text.
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221. See, e.g., McDaniel v. Gile, 230 Cal. App. 3d 363, 373 (Cal. Ct. App. 1991); Brett v.

Berkowitz, 706 A.2d 509, 513 (Del. 1998). See generally Alex B. Long, Lawyers Intentionally

Inflicting Emotional Distress, 42 SETON HALL L. REV. 55, 81–84 (2012) (discussing similar

cases).

222. McDaniel, 230 Cal. App. 3d at 370.

223. See In re Dudley, 2013-OLR-5 (Wis. 2013),

http://www.wicourts.gov/services/public/lawyerreg/statuspublic/dudley.pdf.

224. Iowa Sup. Ct. Bd. of Prof'l Ethics & Conduct v. Steffes, 588 N.W.2d 121, 122–25 (Iowa

1999).

225. Model Rule 1.8(j), which prohibits a lawyer from engaging in sexual relations with a

client, would probably not address the case of the lawyer who manipulates a client into posing
nude since such conduct does not seem to qualify as “sexual relations.” Charles W. Wolfram,
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Ethics 2000 and Conflicts of Interest: The More Things Change . . . ., 70 TENN. L. REV. 27, 55

(2002).
226. See MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 3.5(d) (1983) (prohibiting conduct intended to
disrupt a tribunal); id. R. 4.4(a) (prohibiting a lawyer from using “means that have no substantial
purpose other than to embarrass, delay, or burden a third person”); id. R. 8.4(d) (prohibiting
conduct prejudicial to the administration of justice); Katherine Sylvester, I’m Rubber, You’re

Sued: Should Uncivil Lawyers Receive Ethical Sanctions?, 26 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 1015,

1015–16 (2013) (discussing the relation between civility codes and legal ethics).

227. LEGAL SERVICES BOARD, http://www.legalservicesboard.org.uk/ (last visited Oct. 8,

2015).

228. Hilary Sommerlad et al., Diversity in the Legal Profession in England and Wales: A

Qualitative Study of Barriers and Individual Choices, LEGAL SERVICES BOARD, available at

Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2588594

SSRN DRAFT VERSION (DO NOT DELETE)

No. 2]

1/12/2016 8:45 AM

EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION IN THE LEGAL PROFESSION

145

http://www.legalservicesboard.org.uk/what_we_do/Research/Publications/pdf/lsb_diversity_in_t

he_legal_profession_final_rev.pdf (last visited Oct. 8, 2015).

229. Id. at 6–7.

230. LEGAL SERVICES BOARD, INCREASING DIVERSITY AND SOCIAL MOBILITY IN THE LEGAL

WORKFORCE: TRANSPARENCY AND EVIDENCE 2–3 (2011), available at

http://www.legalservicesboard.org.uk/what_we_do/consultations/closed/pdf/decision_document

_diversity_and_social_mobility_final.pdf.

231. Legal Services Act c. 29 § 1, 2007 (U.K.), available at

http://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/2007/29/section/1. The full list of regulatory objectives is

as follows:

=list

(a) protecting and promoting the public interest;

(b) supporting the constitutional principle of the rule of law;
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(c) improving access to justice;

(d) protecting and promoting the interests of consumers;

(e) promoting competition in the provision of services within subsection (2);

(f) encouraging an independent, strong, diverse and effective legal profession;

(g) increasing public understanding of the citizen's legal rights and duties;

(h) promoting and maintaining adherence to the professional principles.

Id. For a broader discussion of the LSA, see Andrew Boon, Professionalism Under the Legal
Services Act 2007, 17 INT’L J. LEGAL PROF. 195 (2010).
232. Laurel S. Terry, Transnational Legal Practice, 47 INT’L LAW. 485, 485 (2013).

233. SRA CODE OF CONDUCT ch. 2 (2011), available at

http://www.sra.org.uk/solicitors/handbook/code/content.page.

234. Id.

235. Id.

Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2588594

SSRN DRAFT VERSION (DO NOT DELETE)

No. 2]

1/12/2016 8:45 AM

EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION IN THE LEGAL PROFESSION

147

236. Id.

237. Id.

238. Id.

239. Id.

240. BAR STANDARDS BOARD HANDBOOK D1.2 (2015), available at

https://www.barstandardsboard.org.uk/media/1663630/bsb_handbook_sept_2015.pdf.

241. Id.

242. Id.

243. Id.

244. MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 6.1 (1983).

245. See supra note 213 and accompanying text.

246. For example, the State Bar of California requires lawyers to have at least one hour of CLE

credit devoted to the elimination of bias in the legal profession. Some of the examples included
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above are courses that qualify for credit under the rule. The State Bar of California, Qualifying

Activities, CAL. BAR

http://mcle.calbar.ca.gov/Providers/EducationApproval/QualifyingActivities.aspx (last visited
Oct. 8, 2015). Examples of approved courses include “How to Address Negative Attitudes or

Comments of a Judge Toward Minority Attorneys; Sexism in the Field of Criminal Law, and Bias

Against Women in Law.” Press Release, State Bar of California, MCLE Provider Press (2009)

available at http://www.calbar.ca.gov/Portals/0/documents/certification/MCLE_Provider-

Press_Spring09.pdf.

247. Because lawyers are licensed on a statewide basis, the rule should not include local law. A

contrary approach would invite confusion and subject lawyers to differing standards. Chapman v.

Bearfield, 207 S.W.3d 736 (Tenn. 2006).

248. Vincent R. Johnson, Essay, On the Abuse and Limits of Lawyer Discipline, 44 CONN. L.

REV. 53, 57 (2012).
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249. D.C. RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 9.1 cmt. 3 (2015) (“If proceedings are pending before

other organizations, such as the D.C. Office of Human Rights or the Equal Employment

Opportunity Commission, the processing of complaints by Bar Counsel may be deferred or

abated where there is substantial similarity between the complaint filed with Bar Counsel and

material allegations involved in such other proceedings.”).

250. See supra notes 105–107 and accompanying text.

251. See supra notes 76–80 and accompanying text.

252. See supra notes 88–89 and accompanying text.

253. 42 U.S.C. § 12182(b)(2)(A)(iii) (2012).

254. 28 C.F.R. § 36.301(c) (2014); supra note 236 and accompanying text. In another article, I

proposed a comment to Rule 1.4, the rule regarding communication with a client, to clarify the
scope of a lawyer’s duty with respect to communicating with and providing competent

representation to a client with disability. Long, Reasonable Accommodation as Professional
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Responsibility, Reasonable Accommodation as Professionalism, supra note 6, at 1803. That

same comment could be added to proposed Rule 9.1:

=xt

Comment: A lawyer who undertakes to represent a client with whom effective direct lawyer-

client communication can only be maintained through an interpreter, auxiliary aids and services,

or alternative forms of communication must consider the most

appropriate means of communication necessary for effective representation and, where

necessary, secure and pay for the services of a qualified interpreter or provision of auxiliary aids

and services. Id. at 1803.

=ft

255. Cf. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-3(a) (2012). I have previously argued in favor of a separate rule of

professional conduct that would prohibit retaliation against a lawyer who complies with his or
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her ethical duty to report professional misconduct under Rule 8.3(a). See Alex B. Long,

Whistleblowing Attorneys and Ethical Infrastructures, 68 MD. L. REV. 786, 814–16 (2009).
256. Cf. Burlington N. & Santa Fe Ry. Co. v. White, 548 U.S. 53, 68 (2006) (“In our view, a

plaintiff must show that a reasonable employee would have found the challenged action
materially adverse, ‘which in this context means it well might have dissuaded a reasonable
worker from making or supporting a charge of discrimination.’”).
257. Cf. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R 5.1 (1983).

258. See supra Part V.B.

259. See supra notes 237–43 and accompanying text.

260. Ideally, the rule would impose a duty upon the firm itself. However, since nearly every

state has rejected the idea of law firm discipline, the proposed rule reflects a concession to

reality.
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